Federalist Paper by King James I Madison; promoting a Union every bit a safeguard against domestic rebellion and insurrection

Federalist No. 10
JamesMadison.jpg

James Madison, author of Federalist No. 10
Author James Madison
Language English
Series The Federalist
Publisher Daily Advertiser

Publication date

 November 22, 1787
Media type Newspaper
Preceded by Federalist Zero. 9
Followed away Federalist No. 11

Federalist No. 10 is an essay written past James Madison as the ten percent of The Federalist Papers, a series of essays initiated by Alexander Hamilton arguing for the ratification of the USA Organization. Published on November 22, 1787, under the name "Publius", Federalist No. 10 is among the about highly regarded of all American political writings.[1]

No. 10 addresses the question of how to reconcile citizens with interests adverse to the rights of others or hostile to the interests of the community as a whole. Madison saw factions as inevitable due to the nature of man—that is, As long American Samoa hoi polloi hold differing opinions, have differing amounts of wealth and own differing amount of property, they will keep going to form alliances with people who are most mistakable to them and they will sometimes work against the public interest and contravene upon the rights of others. He thus questions how to guard against those dangers.[ citation needed ]

Federalist No. 10 continues a motif begun in Federalist Zero. 9 and is titled "The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard Against Native Faction and Revolt". The healthy serial is cited aside scholars and jurists arsenic an important interpretation and explication of the meaning of the Constitution. Historians such arsenic Charles A. Beard argue that No. 10 shows an explicit rejection by the Founding Fathers of the principles of lineal democracy and factionalism, and argue that Madison suggests that a representative commonwealth is more impelling against partisanship and factionalism.[2] [3]

Madison saw the federal Constitution as providing for a "happy combining" of a republic and a purer commonwealth, with "the heavy and aggregate interests being referred to the national, the local and particular to the State legislatures" consequent in a decentralized polity structure. In his watch, this would make IT "much difficult for unworthy candidates to do the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried."

Background [edit]

Light-brown parchment with "We the people" in large black cursive

Prior to the Organic law, the xiii states were wired together aside the Articles of Confederation. These were, in essence, a military alliance between sovereign nations adoptive to better fight the Revolutionary State of war. Congress had no power to tax, and as a final result, was not able to pay debts sequent from the Revolution. President Madison, Saint George Washington, Benjamin John Hope Franklin and others feared a wear-up of the Federal and national bankruptcy.[4] Corresponding Capital of the United States, Capital of Wisconsin felt the revolution had not resolved the social problems that had triggered it, and the excesses ascribed to the Male monarch were now being continual by the state legislatures. In this view, Shays' Rebellion, an armed rebellion in Massachusetts in 1786, was simply one, albeit uttermost, case of "democratic excess" in the backwash of the Warfare.[5]

A national convention was called for May 1787, to revision the Articles of Confederation. Madison believed that the problem was not with the Articles, just rather the state legislatures, and thusly the solution was not to fix the articles but to restrain the excesses of the states. The principal questions before the convening became whether the states should remain dominant, whether sovereignty should personify transferred to the national politics, or whether a settlement should catch one's breath somewhere in between.[5] Aside mid-June, it was clear that the normal was drafting a current plan of government activity around these issues—a constitution. Madison's nationalist put across shifted the debate increasingly away from a position of unmixed state sovereignty, and toward the via media.[6] In a debate happening June 26, he said that government ought to "protect the nonage of the opulent against the majority" and that unchecked, common communities were subject to "the turbulence and weakness of difficult passions".[7]

Publication [delete]

Black text on white in old-fashioned type

Paul Leicester Ford's concise precedent Federalist No. 10, from his 1898 edition of The Federalist

September 17, 1787 conspicuous the signing of the final document. By its have Article Seven, the constitution drafted by the convention needed ratification away at least 9 of the thirteen states, through unscheduled conventions held in to each one body politic. Opposing-Federalist writers began to publish essays and letters arguing against ratification,[8] and Hamilton recruited James Madison and John Jay to write a serial publication of pro-ratification letters in response.[9]

Care most of the Federalist essays and the vast bulk of The Federalist Papers, No. 10 first appeared in popular newspapers. It was first printed in the Daily Adman nether the name adopted past the Federalist writers, "Publius"; in this IT was remarkable among the essays of Publius, as almost all of them first appeared in i of two other papers: the Independent Diary and the New-York Packet. Federalist No. 37, besides past Madison, was the only other essay to appear commencement in the Advertizer.[10]

Considering the importance later ascribed to the essay, it was reprinted but on a pocket-size scale. On November 23, IT appeared in the Packet and the next day in the Independent Journal. Out of doors New York Metropolis, it made four appearances in early 1788: January 2 in the Penn Gazette, January 10 in the Hudson Valley Time period, January 15 in the Lansingburgh Northern Centinel, and Jan 17 in the Albany Gazette. Though this add up of reprintings was typical for The Federalist essays, more other essays, both Federalist and Anti-Federalist, saw more wider distribution.[11]

On January 1, 1788, the publishing company J. & A. McLean announced that they would publish the kickoff 36 of the essays in a I volume. This volume, entitled The Federalist, was released on March on 2, 1788. George Hopkins' 1802 edition revealed that Madison, Hamilton, and John Jay were the authors of the series, with deuce later printings dividing the work by author. In 1818, St. James Gideon published a third version containing department of corrections by Madison, World Health Organization by that time had accomplished his two terms as President of the United States.[12]

Patrick Henry B. Dawson's edition of 1863 wanted to collect the original newspaper articles, though he did not always find the first instance. Information technology was much reprinted, albeit without his introduction.[13] Paul Leicester Ford's 1898 edition included a prorogue of contents which summarized the essays, with the summaries again misused to preface their respective essays. The first-class honours degree date stamp of publishing and the newspaper name were recorded for each essay. Of forward-looking editions, Jacob E. Jay Cooke's 1961 edition is seen every bit authoritative, and is most used today.[14]

The doubtfulness of faction [edit]

Federalist No. 10 continues the word of the question abroach in Alexander Hamilton's Federalist No. 9. Hamilton there self-addressed the ravaging character of a faction in breaking unconnected the democracy. The question Madison answers, then, is how to eliminate the harmful effects of faction. President Madison defines a faction as "a number of citizens, whether amounting to a minority or absolute majority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community."[15] He identifies the most dangerous source of faction to be the diversity of opinion in political life which leads to dispute ended fundamental issues such as what regime or religion should be preferred.

Madison argues that "the nigh common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequalized distribution of property."[16] He states, "Those who hold and those who are without property ingest ever formed discrete interests in society."[16] Providing some examples of the distinct interests, Madison identified a landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, and "many lesser interests".[16] James Madison insists that they every last belonged to "different classes" that were "actuated past different sentiments and views."[16] Thus, Capital of Wisconsin argues, these different classes would represent prone to draw decisions in their own sake, and not for the public unspoiled. A law regarding private debts, for instance, would constitute "a question to which the creditors are parties happening one face, and the debtors on the other." To this question, and to others the like it, Madison notes that, though "justice ought to hold the balance between them," the interested parties would reach different conclusions, "neither with a sole regard to justice and the semipublic serious."

Like the anti-Federalists who opposing him, Madison was substantially influenced by the work of Montesquieu, though Madison and Montesquieu disagreed on the question addressed therein essay. He too relied intemperately along the philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment, especially David Hume, whose influence is most clear in Madison's word of the types of junto and in his contention for an extended republic.[17] [18]

Madison's arguments [edit]

President Madison low gear theorizes that there are two ways to limit the damage caused by faction: either remove the causes of junto Beaver State control its effects. He past describes the two methods to move out the causes of cabal: first, destroying liberty, which would work because "shore leave is to sect what air is to fire",[19] but information technology is impossible to perform because liberty is essential to view life, even as air is "essential to animal life." After all, Americans fought for information technology during the American Revolutionary War. The second option, creating a society homogeneous in opinions and interests, is impracticable. The diversity of the people's power is what makes them succeed more Oregon less, and inequality of property is a right that the authorities should protect. Madison specially emphasizes that economic stratification prevents everyone from sharing the indistinguishable opinion. Madison concludes that the damage caused by sect nates be moderate only aside dominant its effects.

He then argues that the lone problem comes from majority factions because the principle of pop sovereignty should prevent minority factions from gaining might. President Madison offers deuce ways to check majority factions: keep the "existence of the same passion or interest in a majority simultaneously" or translate a majority faction unable to turn.[20] Madison concludes that a small democracy cannot avert the dangers of majority faction because small size means that undesirable passions buttocks very easily spread to a majority of the people, which can and so reenact its leave through the democratic government without difficulty.

Madison states, "The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man",[21] so the cure is to control their effects. He makes an argument connected how this is not possible in a pure democracy but possible in a republic. With pure democracy, he means a system in which every citizen votes directly for laws (lead democracy), and, with republic, he intends a society in which citizens elect a small body of representatives World Health Organization then vote for laws (representative democracy). He indicates that the voice of the people pronounced by a body of representatives is more conformable to the interest of the community, since, again, common people's decisions are mannered by their self-interest.

He then makes an argument in privilege of a large republic against a microscopic republic for the choice of "fit characters"[22] to comprise the public's voice. In a too large republic, where the number of voters and candidates is greater, the probability to selected competent representatives is broader. The voters have a wider option. In a small republic, it would also cost easier for the candidates to fool the voters but Thomas More rugged in a large unmatched. The last argument Madison makes in favou of a large republic is that American Samoa, in a small commonwealth, in that respect will exist a lower variety of interests and parties, a majority will more frequently cost found. The number of participants of that majority will be lower, and, since they sleep in a more express territory, it would be easier for them to agree and work together for the accomplishment of their ideas. While in a large republic the variety of interests will be greater so to make information technology harder to find a majority. Even if there is a majority, it would be harder for them to work together because of the plurality of people and the fact they are spread call at a wider territory.

A democracy, Madison writes, is different from a democracy because its politics is situated in the custody of delegates, and, as a result of this, it can make up elongated over a larger area. The thought is that, in a large democracy, there will be more "fit characters" to opt from for each delegate. Also, the fact that from each one representative is chosen from a bigger constituency should make the "vicious arts" of electioneering[22] (a reference to grandiloquence) less effective. For example, in a enormous republic, a corrupt delegate would indigence to bribe many more than people in order to win an election than in a small republic. Also, in a republic, the delegates some filter and refine the many demands of the people so as to prevent the type of frivolous claims that occlude purely parliamentary governments.

Though Madison argued for a large and diverse republic, the writers of the Federalist Papers recognized the need for a balance. They wanted a republic diverse enough to prevent faction but with decent commonality to hold out cohesiveness among the states. In Federalist Nobelium. 2, Jay counted as a grace that America possessed "uncomparable united people—a people descended from the same ancestors, the same oral communicatio, profession the same religion".[23] Madison himself addresses a limitation of his conclusion that large constituencies will provide better representatives. He notes that if constituencies are too large, the representatives will be "too little acquainted with entirely their local circumstances and lesser interests".[22] He says that this problem is partly resolved by federalism. Regardless how large the constituencies of federal representatives, local anaesthetic matters will be looked after by state and local officials with course smaller constituencies.

Contemporaneous counterarguments [edit]

Portrait of George Clinton

George Clinton, believed to be the Anti-Federalist writer Cato

The Anti-Federalists vigorously contested the notion that a republic of diverse interests could outlast. The author Cato (another nom de guerr, near likely that of George Clinton)[24] summarized the Anti-Federalist position in the article Cato no. 3:

Whoever seriously considers the immense extent of territory comprehended within the limits of the United States, with the mixed bag of its climates, productions, and commerce, the difference of extent, and number of inhabitants in all; the dissimilitude of worry, morals, and policies, in nearly every one, will receive it as an intuitive truth, that a consolidated Republican political system therein, can never human body a perfect union, lay down justice, check domestic quietude, promote the general-purpose welfare, and shielded the blessings of liberty to you and your posterity, for to these objects it must personify directed: this unkindred legislature therefore, poised of interests opposite and different in their nature, will in its physical exertion, emphatically be, like a house divided against itself.[25]

Generally, IT was their position that republics about the size of it of the individual states could survive, but that a democracy on the size of the Unionized would fail. A particular point in support of this was that to the highest degree of US were focused on one diligence—to vulgarise, commerce and shipping in the northern states and plantation farming in the grey. The Anti-Federalist notion that the wide disparity in the economic interests of the diverse states would lead to controversy was mayhap realized in the American Civil Warfare, which about scholars attribute to this disparity.[26] Madison himself, in a letter to Thomas Jefferson, noted that differing economic interests had created dispute, even when the Constitution was organism shorthand.[27] At the convention, he particularly known the distinction between the north and southern states equally a "line of favoritism" that formed "the real dispute of interests".[28]

The give-and-take of the ideal size for the republic was not restricted to the options of person states or panoptic unionized. In a letter to Richard Damage, Benjamin Thrill noted that "Some of our enlightened work force who begin to despair of a more complete union of the States in Congress accept on the QT proposed an Mid-Atlantic, Middle, and Southern Confederacy, to atomic number 4 united by an alliance offensive and defensive".[29]

In making their arguments, the Opposed-Federalists appealed to some historical and theoretical evidence. On the theoretical English, they leaned heavily connected the work of Prince Charles Diamond State Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu. The Anti-Federalists Brutus and Cato both quoted Montesquieu happening the issue of the ideal size of a republic, citing his program line in The Spirit of the Laws that:

It is innate to a republic to have only a pocket-size territory, differently it cannot farseeing subsist. In a large republic in that respect are manpower of large fortunes, and consequently of less moderation; there are trusts too great to live placed in any exclusive subject; helium has interest of his personal; He before long begins to think that He may be elated, great and glorious, by oppressing his fellow citizens; and that he may raise himself to grandeur on the ruins of his country. In a large republic, the public superb is sacrificed to a thousand views; it is junior-grade to exceptions, and depends on accidents. In a small unrivaled, the interestingness of the public is easier sensed, better comprehended, and more within the reach of every citizen; abuses are of less extent, and of course are less protected.[30]

Greece and Rome were looked to as fashion mode republics throughout this debate,[31] and authors along both sides took Roman pseudonyms. Brutus points extinct that the Greek and Roman states were small, whereas the U.S. is huge. He also points out that the expansion of these republics resulted in a transition from free government to tyranny.[32]

Modern analysis and reaction [edit]

In the first centred of the American republic, No. 10 was not regarded as among the more important numbers of The Federalist. For example, in Democracy in America, Alexis Charles Henri Maurice de Tocqueville refers specifically to more than 50 of the essays, but No. 10 is not among them.[33] Today, however, No. 10 is regarded as a seminal work of American democracy. In "The Citizenry's Voter turnout", a popular survey conducted away the Domestic Archives and Records Presidency, National History Day, and U.S. News and World Report, No. 10 (along with Federalist Nary. 51, also by Madison) was elect Eastern Samoa the 20th to the highest degree important written document in United States chronicle.[34] David Epstein, authorship in 1984, described it as among the almost extremely regarded of all American political writing.[35]

The historian Charles A. Beard identified Federalist No. 10 as one of the nigh portentous documents for understanding the Constitution. In his book An Social science Interpretation of the Constitution of the In agreement States (1913), Byssus argued that President Madison produced a detailed explanation of the economic factors that lay out behind the creation of the Constitution. At the outset of his study, Beard writes that James Madison provided "a skilled statement of the theory of social science determinism in government" (Beard 1913, p. 15). Later in his contemplate, Beard perennial his point, providing more vehemence. "The most philosophical examination of the foundations of profession scientific discipline is made by Madison in the tenth number," Byssus writes. "Hither he lays down, in nary iffy language, the principle that the premier and basic concern of every government is economic" (Whiskers 1913, p. 156).

Douglass Adair attributes the raised interest in the tenth keep down to Charles A. Byssus's book An Economic Reading of the Constitution, promulgated in 1913. Adair too contends that Beard's selective concentre on the issue of class struggle, and his political progressivism, has colored modern scholarship on the essay. According to Adair, Byssus reads No. 10 as evidence for his belief in "the Organization arsenic an instrument of class exploitation".[36] Adair's own view is that Federalist No more. 10 should cost register every bit "eighteenth-century political orientation directed to an eighteenth-century problem; and ... one of the great notional achievements of that intellectual movement that later ages have christened 'Jeffersonian democracy'".[37]

Garry Wills is a noted critic of Madison's argument in Federalist No. 10. In his book Explaining America, he adopts the spatial relation of Robert Pigeon pea in arguing that Madison's framework does not necessarily enhance the protections of minorities or ascertain the commonweal. As an alternative, Wills claims: "Minorities can make usage of distributed and staggered political machinery to clog, delay, slow down, hamper, and obstruct the majority. But these weapons for delay are given to the minority irrespective of its factious Oregon nonfactious character; and they can personify used against the majority irrespective of its factious or nonfactious fictional character. What Madison prevents is not faction, only action. What helium protects is not the common good but delay in and of itself".[38]

Application [edit]

Federalist No. 10 is sometimes cited as showing that the Founding Fathers and the constitutional framers did not intend American politics to be partisan. For exemplify, U.S. Supreme Court justice John Paul the Apostle Stevens cites the paper for the statement that "Parties ranked high on the list of evils that the Constitution was designed to check".[39] Justice Byron White cited the essay while discussing a California provision that forbids candidates from functional A independents within one year of material possession a denominational tie, saying, "California apparently believes with the Founding Fathers that splintered parties and unrestrained factionalism Crataegus laevigata do significant price to the fabric of government."[40]

Madison's disputation that restraining liberty to limit faction is an unacceptable solution has been victimized by opponents of campaign finance limits. Justice Clarence Thomas, for exercise, invoked Federalist No. 10 in a dissent against a powerful supporting limits on campaign contributions, writing: "The Framers preferred a political system that controlled such cabal for good, preserving liberty while also ensuring good regime. Sort o than adopting the repressive 'cure' for junto that the majority today endorses, the Framers armed individual citizens with a remedy."[41]

References [cut]

  1. ^ Epstein, p. 59.
  2. ^ Manweller 2005, p. 22.
  3. ^ Gustafson 1992, p. 290.
  4. ^ Leonard Bernstein, pp. 11–12, 81–109.
  5. ^ Natalie Wood, Idea, p. 104.
  6. ^ Stewart, p. 182.
  7. ^ Yates. [1]
  8. ^ For instance, the of import Anti-Federalist authors "Cato" and "Brutus" debuted in New York papers happening September 27 and October 18, 1787 respectively. Realise Furtwangler, pp. 48–49.
  9. ^ Ball, p. xvii.
  10. ^ Dates and publication information at "The Federalist", Constitution Society. Accessed January 22, 2011.
  11. ^ Kaminski and Saladino, Vol XIV, p. 175.
  12. ^ Adair, pp. 44–46. Run into also "The Federalist Papers: Timeline", SparkNotes. Accessed January 22, 2011.
  13. ^ Ford, p. xl.
  14. ^ Throughout Storing, for example, and relied upon aside Delaware Pauw, pp. 202–204. For Ball, p. 47, it is the "authoritative edition" and "still stands Eastern Samoa the most complete bookish version".
  15. ^ Federalist No. 10. p. 56 of the Dawson edition at Wikisource.
  16. ^ a b c d Dawson 1863, p. 58.
  17. ^ Cohler, pp. 148–161.
  18. ^ Adair, pp. 93–106.
  19. ^ Federalist No. 10. p. 56 of the Dawson version at Wikisource.
  20. ^ Federalist No. 10. p. 60 of the Dawson edition at Wikisource.
  21. ^ Federalist No. 10. p. 57 of the Dawson variation at Wikisource.
  22. ^ a b c Federalist None. 10. p. 62 of the Dawson edition at Wikisource.
  23. ^ Federalist No. 2. pp. 7–8 of the Dawson edition at Wikisource.
  24. ^ See the accounts aside, and conclusions of, Storing, Vol 1, pp. 102–104, Kaminski, p. 131, pp. 309–310, and Sir Henry Joseph Wood, Creation, p. 489. De Pauw, pp. 290–292, prefers Abraham Yates.
  25. ^ Cato, no more. 3. The Founders' Constitution. Volume 1, Chapter 4, Document 16. University of Windy City Press. Retrieved January 22, 2011.
  26. ^ Ransom, Roger L. "Political economy of the Civil War". Profitable History Association. August 24, 2001. Referenced November 20, 2005. Citing Whiskers; Hacker; Egnal; Ransom and Sutch; Bensel; and McPherson, Ransom notes that "location economic specialization ... generated very weapons-grade regional divisions on economic issues ... economic changes in the Northern states were a major factor leading to the political crash of the 1850s ... the sectional splits on these economical issues ... led to a growing crisis in economic policy".
  27. ^ Letter by Madison to Jefferson, October 24, 1787. "James Madison to Thomas Jefferson". The Founders' Constitution. Volume 1, Chapter 17, Document 22. University of Chicago Press. Retrieved January 22, 2011.
  28. ^ Cohler, p. 151.
  29. ^ Letter away Benzoin Rushing to Richard Price, Oct 27, 1786. "Benjamin Rush to Richard Price". The Founders' Constitution. Volume 1, Chapter 7, Document 7. University of Chicago Press. Retrieved January 22, 2011.
  30. ^ Montesquieu, Spirit Of Laws, ch. xvi. vol. I, book Ogdoad, cited in Brutus, Nobelium. 1. The Founders' Constitution. Volume 1, Chapter 4, Papers 14. University of Windy City Press. Retrieved Jan 22, 2011.
  31. ^ Yates is nourished with examples.
  32. ^ Brutus, No. 1. The Founders' Fundamental law. Volume 1, Chapter 4, Written document 14. University of Chicago Pressur. Retrieved January 22, 2011. "History furnishes no example of a free democracy, whatsoever thing like the extent of the United States. The Grecian republics were of small extent; so also was that of the Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Romans. Both of these, it is unfeigned, in operation of clip, prolonged their conquests over large territories of body politic; and the consequence was, that their governments were denatured from that of resign governments to those of the most tyrannical that ever existed in the world".
  33. ^ Adair, p. 110.
  34. ^ "The Populate's Voting", ourdocuments.gov, National Archives and Records Administration. Retrieved January 22, 2011.
  35. ^ Epstein, p. 59.
  36. ^ Adair, pp. 120–124. Quotation at p. 123.
  37. ^ Adair, p. 131.
  38. ^ Wills, p. 195.
  39. ^ California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 592 (2000) [2]
  40. ^ Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736 (1974) [3]
  41. ^ Richard M. Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 424 (2000) [4]

Secondary sources [edit]

  • Adair, Douglass. "The Tenth Federalist Revisited" and "'That Politics May Be Reduced to a Skill': David Hume, James Madison and the Tenth part Federalist". Fame and the Founding Fathers. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1998. ISBN 978-0-86597-193-6 Unaccustomed York: WW Norton & Cobalt, 1974 ISBN 978-0-393-05499-6
  • Ball, Terence. The Federalist with Letters of "Marcus Junius Brutus". Cambridge University Press: 2003. ISBN 978-0-521-00121-2
  • Beard, Charles A. An Scheme Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States. Current York: The MacMillan Company, 1913.
  • Bernstein, Richard B. Are We to Be a Nation? Cambridge, Milliampere: Harvard University Press, 1987. ISBN 978-0-674-04476-0
  • Cohler, Anne. Montesquieu's Relative Politics and the Emotional state of American Constitutionalism. Lawrence of Arabi: University Press of Kansas, 1988. ISBN 978-0-521-36974-9
  • Dawson, Joseph Henry B., ed. The Fœderalist: A Aggregation of Essays, Written in favour of the New Constitution, As Agreed Upon by the Fœderal Conventionality, September 17, 1787. New York: Charles Scribner, 1863.
  • Epstein, David F. The Political Theory of The Federalist. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984. ISBN 978-0-226-21300-2
  • Furtwangler, Albert. The Authority of Publius: A Reading material of the Federalist Document. Ithaca, New York: Katherine Cornell University Fourth estate, 1984. ISBN 978-0-8014-1643-9
  • President Gran DePauw, Linda. The Ordinal Pillar: New York and the Federal Constitution. Ithaki, Empire State: Cornell University Pressur, 1966. ISBN 978-0-8014-0104-6
  • Gustafson, Saint Thomas (1992). Representative Words: Political science, Lit, and the American Nomenclature, 1776–1865. Cambridge Press. ISBN978-0-521-39512-0.
  • Kaminski, John P. George Hilary Clinton: Yeoman Politician of the New Democracy. Madison: State Historical Companionship of Wisconsin, 1993. ISBN 978-0-945612-17-9
  • Manweller, Mathew (2005). The People Vs. the Courts: Judicial Review and Direct Commonwealth in the American Legal Organisation . Academica Press, LLC. p. 22. ISBN978-1-930901-97-1.
  • Morgan, Edmund S. * "Safety in Numbers: Madison, Hume, and the Tenth 'Federalist,'" Collis Potter Huntington Subroutine library Quarterly (1986) 49#2 pp. 95–112 in JSTOR
  • Jimmy Stewart, St. David O. The Summer of 1787: The Work force World Health Organization Invented the Formation. New York: Marvin Neil Simon & Schuster, 2007. ISBN 978-0-7432-8692-3
  • Wills, Garry. Explaining America: The Federalist. New York: Penguin Books, 1982. ISBN 978-0-14-029839-0
  • Wood, Gordon. The Creation of the Dry land Democracy, 1776–1787. Chapel Hill, NC: UNC Compress, 1998. ISBN 978-0-8078-4723-7
  • Wood, Gordon. The Approximation of America: Reflections on the Giving birth of the United States. New York: Penguin Press, 2011. ISBN 978-1-59420-290-2

Primary sources [edit]

  • Hamilton, Alexander; Madison, James II; and Jay, John. The Federalist. Edited by Jacob E. Cooke. Middletown, Conn.: Methodist University Press, 1961. Wesleyan 1982 edition: ISBN 978-0-8195-6077-3
  • Hamilton, Horse parsley; Madison, Henry James; and John Jay, John. The Federalist. Edited aside Henry B. Dawson. Morrisania, New York: Charles Scribner, 1863. Accessed January 22, 2011.
  • Alexander Hamilton, Alexander; Madison, James; and Jay, John. The Federalist. Edited by St. Paul Leicester Ford Madox Ford. Greater New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1898.
  • Kaminski, John P. and Saladino, Gaspare J., male erecticle dysfunction. The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution. Madison: Tell Arts Social club of Wisconsin, 1981. ISBN 978-0-87020-372-5
  • Storing, Herbert J.; Dry, Murray, ed. The Fill in Anti-Federalist. Vols 1–7. Stops: University of Chicago Urge, 1981. ISBN 0-226-77566-6
  • Yates, Robert. Notes of the Secret Debate of the Federal Rule of 1787. Washington, D.C.: Templeman, 1886. Accessed January 22, 2011.
  • "Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974)". Findlaw . Retrieved October 1, 2005.
  • "President Nixo v. Shrink Missouri Government Political action committee, 528 U.S. 377 (2000)". Findlaw . Retrieved August 23, 2005.
  • "California Advocate Party v. Mary Harris Jone, 530 U.S. 567 (2000)". Findlaw . Retrieved August 23, 2005.

External links [cut]

  • Text of The Federalist No. 10: congress.gov
  • Online text of Marcus Junius Brutus, No. 1, University of Chicago.
  • Online textbook of Cato, no. 3, same source as above

the federalist was a series of essays written by

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federalist_No._10